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Abstract
The impact of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as the 45th US
president in the context of stock market reactions and economic policy
uncertainty (EPU) within three key zones in ‘the Greater China Region’
(Hong Kong, Taiwan and China Mainland) are examined in this article.
The chosen research period is from January 2014 to June 2017, and
the EPU Index in the USA and the UK is used as a proxy to measure
political uncertainty in two of the world major economies and how
they impact on the Chinese stock market. The main contribution of the
article can be found in the analysis of how stock market performance
can be driven by policy-related uncertainty shocks in the international
context. The results show that the stock markets in the ‘Greater China
Region’ did not seem to react either to the uncertainty generated by
Brexit or to the election of Donald Trump, implying that the Chinese
stock markets appear to be quite resilient to the recent political events
that have been disrupting the global economy.
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1. Introduction
From the 1970s, researchers have identified political risk as a significant
factor that can severely disturb the performance of developing and emerging countries (Benacek, Lenihan, Andreosso-O’Callaghan, Michalikova,
& Kan, 2014; Suleman, 2012). Earlier explanations in the field suggest
that political events can cause a significant loss of wealth that can also
trigger increases in stock market volatility (Brewer, 1981; Clark, 1997;
Clark & Tunaru, 2003; Root, 1972; Simon, 1982). The magnitude and
relevance of materialised losses are also linked to unfolding political
events that can subsequently spill over to the rest of the economy by the
generation of economic and financial uncertainty (Clark & Tunaru, 2005).
Recent political events, in a macroeconomic context, such as the UK’s
decision to leave the European Union (EU) in June 2016 and the election
of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the USA signify important
changes to the world economies. As we are moving into a new area of
remarkable ambiguity, global economic stability and growth are being
challenged once more. Trump’s initial approach to international relations
with China has been creating significant levels of confusion and concern
among leaders in Beijing. During his campaign, the candidate made serious
accusations against China, with messages stating that China was a currency
manipulator and that it was stealing millions of jobs from the US economy.
Furthermore, he beckoned the need of getting a new deal from China that
in view of his inexperience in foreign affairs has just been contributing to
making the situation more chaotic and that seems to be leading towards
a commercial antagonism between the two countries. Concern has been
raised around Trump’s intent of renegotiating some of the existing trade
treaties and of introducing tariffs on Chinese goods of up to 45 per cent,
threats that have now become a reality with the introduction of tariffs on
Chinese steel and aluminium imports. Analysts are indicating that the
Trump’s administration might harden tax imports, and that the alleged currency manipulation in China would justify the introduction of protectionist
measures. However, as the situation unfolds, Chinese authorities and the
international community are quite unsure of what to expect from the US
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new President’s initial comments, and countries are starting to retaliate.
At the same time, the UK new Prime Minister, Theresa May, is trying to
redefine the UK’s relations with countries, such as China, with the aim
of ensuring that an optimal balance between the economic and political
dimension be kept. The development of a coherent strategy emanating from
London that looks to build on a sustainable strategy towards China seems
to be another source of ambiguity and uncertainty. In general, analysts’
views are quite mixed, with some suggesting that China could be a clear
winner, and others a loser from the Trump and Brexit situation. Hence,
the main motivation of this research article is twofold:
•
•

to identify the main challenges and opportunities that the new US
President and Brexit events are bringing to the Chinese economy
in terms of its international position.
to examine China’s strategic moves to deal with the uncertainty
created by Trump’s election and Brexit on its economic growth
and development and its strategic position in the Pacific region.

To illustrate the points outlined earlier, this article examines whether the
financial markets of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China reacted in a
similar or different fashion to Brexit and to Trump’s election. The analysis
is supported by the use of the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Index
for the USA and the UK, with the aim of measuring market instability
over the period and implications for the selected stock markets. To the
best of the authors’ knowledge, this study would be the first attempt to
analyse how Brexit and the recent US Presidential election impacted on
the stock markets of the Greater China Region, which refers to Mainland
China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau.1

2. Brexit and the New US Administration:
Implications for ‘The Greater China Region’
The world is facing challenging times, as the balance of regional power
is shifting with emerging economies taking more prominent roles, while
developed economies seem to be deploying anti-globalisation and protectionist policies (Tanaka, 2017). For several advanced economies, the
scenario is one where a surge of populism accompanies a sentiment of
anti-free trade, a phenomenon that has clearly been illustrated by both the
UK Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump as the President of
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the USA in 2016. When looking at emerging economies, the case of China
can be considered as outstanding. China has undergone rapid economic
growth over the past three decades, and in 2011, China’s GDP overtook
that of Japan, and the country became the second largest economy in the
world. However, years of double-digit growth have given way to a new
model that is considered as the new normal and which has refocused to
target annual growth rates at around 6.5 per cent. This level of growth
could be affected if the Trump’s administration takes a more hostile
approach towards China, and this could unfold into a trade antagonism
that would damage the interests of the country as well as those of the
East Asian region as a whole. As China is benefiting from globalisation,
and its global and regional power keeps increasing, the study of how the
Greater China Region might be impacted upon by an increase of market
uncertainty triggered by recent political events originating in two of the
world most developed economies is of key interest. An analysis of policy
uncertainty combined with stock markets performance will offer an initial
view on how the Greater China Region reacted to the uncertainty created
by the new political wave.
China is considered as an export-intensive economy by global standards, whose economic projections are heavily linked to the strength and
health of world trade. As a result, recent geopolitical events are a source
of major concern to Chinese policymakers. President Trump’s policies
and views towards China need to be closely monitored, as the USA is
one of China’s key trading partners, a situation that came to light with the
2008 Global Financial Crisis. If Trump’s plans to introduce tariff barriers
targeting China (of 45% on Chinese imports) materialise, Chinese total
exports will be significantly affected in the short term, given that around
20 per cent of the country’s total exports are bound to the US economy.
The situation is further convoluted by the uncertainty that surrounds the
Trump’s administration economic policy programme. Moreover, the case
of Brexit is also a major area of concern, but in this case, China might
be able to weather a negative impact on its economy in the short term,
as China exports to the UK account only for 2.5 per cent. However, in
the medium to long term, the implications would be more important, as
the departure of the UK from the EU could signify a change in direction
regarding trade policies from the EU towards emerging markets regions.
Bearing in mind that the UK has traditionally been representing one of
the most liberal-minded trading economies in the EU, its departure from
the EU could make the materialisation of a deeper China–EU economic
deal (a long-term objective) quite difficult. Additionally, a chaotic Brexit
where trade and investment are significantly disrupted will cause a
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knock-on effect in the Eurozone with clear ramifications in China. The
industrial sectors that will clearly be affected are chemicals, machinery
and consumer-based sectors since China exports around 15–20 per cent
of its global total to Europe. Therefore, the UK’s decision to leave the
EU can damage China’s global position in the long term, as the country
could be left in a remarkable vulnerable position. China’s strong commitment to export activities makes the country quite susceptible to the
potential upsurge in protectionist measures that are being sought by major
advanced economies.
Examining the impact of Brexit and Donald Trump’s election on the
performance of the main stock markets in the Greater China Region will
offer an initial view on how the country is reacting to global uncertainty.
The stock markets of Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong are considered to be quite different regarding their levels of political freedom, the
fairness of their political system and the level of centralisation in terms
of their political and economic approach and also in terms of the level of
market intervention. Mainland China is characterised by a more rigid and
centralised model with heavy political control on its economic model. The
region also exhibits the highest levels of economic growth. In contrast,
Taiwan enjoys the highest level of political freedom of all four sub-markets
while its economic and legal system seem to be fairer. Hong Kong is well
known for its relatively non-interventionist economic policies, encompassing the freedom of capital movements and a well-developed regulatory and
legal environment. These conditions have contributed to the development
and consolidation of Hong Kong as a regional and international financial
centre. Hong Kong Stock Exchange plays a major role in raising capital
for Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Economic growth in Hong
Kong is based on a free market economy with strong ties to international
trade and finance, characteristics that left its economy significantly exposed
to the 2008 Global Economic and Financial Crisis. However, due to its
increasing level of integration with Mainland China, Hong Kong managed
to execute a swift recovery from the global meltdown. However, its heavy
reliance on foreign trade and investment is enhancing its vulnerability in
the global context. Taiwan’s economic model relies on an export-oriented
approach like the one followed by Hong Kong. The main trading partner
of Taiwan is Mainland China, which makes its economic and financial
model quite exposed to external shocks and more specifically to disruptions originating from China. This entails that Taiwan is more sensitive
to regional issues rather than to global and international events. This
is illustrated by the economic slowdown faced by Taiwan that can be
somehow explained by the economic deceleration experienced by China
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over the past few years with its transition from a double-digit growing
economy to a new normal growth model. In the international context,
Taiwan’s economic relations with the USA keep improving, as the USA
is Taiwan’s second largest trading partner and its main source of foreign
direct investment (Rosier, O’Connor, & Cuevas, 2016).

3. Political Events, Policy Uncertainty and
Stock Market Reactions
Political events and, in particular, the impact and implications that political risk might have on the performance of stock markets are the areas
of research that do not seem to attract the same amount of attention as
the risks associated with asset pricing, market (systemic) risk, interest
rate risk, exchange rate risk or credit risk (Bilson, Brailsford, & Hooper,
2002). Furthermore, the case of emerging markets—and especially of
those markets that are characterised by a rigid and less liberal approach
in their economic and/or political regimes—is commonly associated with
greater levels of uncertainty (Benacek et al., 2014; Bin, 2015). Political
stability is an area of concern for a country’s economic and financial performance because a political environment that is predictable and reliable
offers a favourable environment for investors who perceive the economy
to be less risky (Manzoor, 2013). Unstable political situations have been
associated with a significant reduction in foreign direct investment as
the market is not considered safe, and economic and financial activities
might not be properly controlled and monitored, with potential failures
in terms of law compliance and transparency of operations (Chan & Wei,
1996). Furthermore, developing economies that face disruptions due to an
unstable political climate appear to be more affected by macroeconomic
imbalances that lead to greater levels of risk rather than to disruptions with
origins in international events (Aggarwal, Inclan, & Leal, 1999; Khalid
& Rajaguru, 2010).
Research exploring the implications of political risk on market performance seems to be focused on the analysis of political news and the way
financial markets react to them. In particular, stock markets seem to be
more responsive to new information regarding political decisions rather
than to information that looks into implications and spillover effects of
domestic and foreign policy. According to Tan and Gannon (2002), the
reaction of the stock market depends on the political news, with prices
expected to increase if the news lead to an upward revision of investor’s
expectations and prices following a downward trend if the opposite occurs.
Researchers have followed different approaches when looking at political
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events and analysing market reactions. For instance, Soultanaeva (2008)
used political news as a proxy to analyse political risk and found a weak
relationship between political risk and the volatility of the stock market.
Fong and Koh (2002) looked at the Hong Kong stock market and how
political risk has induced a regime shift in stock market volatility with a
strong evidence found in terms of regime shift in conditional volatility
as well as significant volatility asymmetry during highly volatile periods.
Mahmood, Irfan, Iqbal, Kamran, and Ijaz (2014) examined 50 major
political events in Pakistan and their impact on the KSE-100 index returns
with the aim of illustrating how political events contribute to increased
levels of economic risk in the context of a less developed economy that
might be more reactive to unstable political conditions when compared
to developed economies (Bittlingmayer, 1998). Research findings show
that the Pakistani stock market reacts to political events and that, as a
result, investors are quite hesitant to participate in this market. The case
of Pakistan is an interesting one as its political environment has been
quite unpredictable over the past 50 years; this has been characterised by
the inability of any elected government to complete their 5-year mandate.
Colombia is another example of a less developed economy that has been
examined and that shows how market returns are negatively influenced by
criminal activities and an uncertain political environment (Laverde, Varua,
& Garces-Ozanne, 2009). Researchers have found that political stability
conditions might contribute to accelerate long-term growth projections.
On the other hand, research outcomes focusing on developed economies
seem to offer a different view regarding the magnitude and implications
that political uncertainty might bring to stock markets performance. For
example, Dopke and Pierdzioch (2006) looked at the performance of
the German stock exchange and they found a poor relationship between
political changes and stock market performance.
The conducted literature review shows that most of the research in
the field seems to be looking at the impact on internal/domestic political events with little attention given to external and global shocks in the
context of developing and emerging economies. As a result, a research
gap has been identified in the area, and considering recent developments
in the international political arena, this study is bringing a clear contribution to this area.

3.1 Economic Policy Uncertainty
EPU refers to a non-zero probability of changes in the existing economic policies that determine the rule of the game for economic agents
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(Baker, Bloom, & Davis, 2012, 2016). EPU can impact upon economic and
financial agents in different manners: (a) firms may change or delay investment decisions depending on the levels of employment, consumption and
savings; (b) production costs might be affected, and investment patterns
can change depending on the economic cycle; and (c) risks in financial
markets can be impacted as inflation rates, interest rates and expected risk
premiums will vary depending on EPU. Recent economic and political
events have increased researchers’ interests in understanding the economic
impact of policy uncertainty (Bloom, 2009). In particular, the implications of EPU for financial risk management and the implications for stock
market performance is an area of study that is not much developed with
most of the existing research focusing on the analysis of market performance over the last two or three decades (Anatonakakis, Chatziantoniou,
& Filis, 2013; Brogaard & Detzel, 2015; Kang & Ratti, 2015; Li & Peng,
2017; Liu & Zhang, 2015). The extant literature shows significant evidence
that EPU does confound market participants and policymakers, in terms
of financial risk. Li and Peng (2017) showed that the absolute changes
in the US EPU index have a negative impact on the co-movement of the
domestic market. Another recent study looking at policy uncertainty and
implications for the US stock market volatility by Arouri, Estay, Rault,
and Roubaud (2016) shows that an increase in policy uncertainty reduces
in a significant manner stock returns and that the effects become stronger
and persistent during times of extreme market volatility. However, to the
best of the authors’ knowledge, the implications of Brexit and of the new
US administration combined with the analysis of EPU and implications
for the Greater China Region is an area of research that has not being
addressed as yet. Moreover, the recent literature in the area (Hammoudeh
& McAleer, 2015) highlights how the topic of financial risk management
and its connections to policy uncertainty is a topic widely researched,
cited and downloaded, justifying thereby the need for further empirical
contributions in the area.

4. Data Description and Methodological
Framework
The data chosen to support this study is based on daily time series of stock
market indices downloaded from DataStream. The Standard and Poor’s
500 index and the FTSE 100 index are selected as proxies for stock market
behaviour that take into account political instability in the USA and the
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UK. The Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE composite Index), the Hong Kong’s
Hang-Seng index and the Shanghai Security Exchange SSE composite
indices are selected to measure stock market performance in the Greater
China Region. The selected sample covers the period from January 2014
to June 2017. To control for political instability, the policy uncertainty
index is also included as part of the study. The US EPU index and the
UK EPU index are obtained from the EPU website. The EPU indices are
computed on the basis of daily news from newspaper archives that contain
thousands of newspapers and other news sources from across the globe.
Studies using Baker’s et al. (2012) EPU measures found that the indices
are a good proxy for real-world economy policy uncertainty (Wang,
Chen, & Huang, 2014). Consequently, this study also considers EPU as
a variable that will help us adjust our models with the aim of creating a
stronger filter for the political events under consideration.

4.1 Brexit Highlights
Back in June 2016, the UK voters chose to leave the EU, and soon afterwards, they welcomed their new Prime Minister Theresa May. The Prime
Minister confirmed the exit of the UK from the EU by triggering Article
50 of the Lisbon Treaty on 29 March 2017. For the purpose of this study,
the Brexit event timeline needs to be considered, as it will determine how
the dummy variables that look after Brexit are constructed.
Figures 1 and 2 offer a general overview on the behaviour of the
EPU indices close to the outcome of the UK referendum and the US
Table 1. Year 2016
June 23

June 24

June 25

June 28

June 30

UK holds a
referendum
on whether
to leave EU

Referendum
results: 52%
voters chose
to leave EU

Jonathan Hill
resigns as
EU financial
services chief

German
Chancellor
Angela
Merkel
informs
Cameron of
no ‘cherry
picking and
no informal
talks’

Theresa May
declares
candidacy
for the
Conservative
party

(Table 1 continued)
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(Table 1 continued)
July 5

July 8

July 13

July 26

July 27

Three of the
UK’s largest
real-estate
funds freeze
assets after
Brexit vote
due to the
burst of
redemptions

Julian King
replaces
Jonathan
Hill as head
of financial
services

Theresa May
becomes
Prime
Minister

The Financial
Times
Reports that
Fox wants the
UK to leave
Europe’s
custom union

Theresa May
says the UK’s
future trade
relationship
with the EU
should not be
‘a model on the
shelf already’

November 4

November 21 November 23 November 24 November 29

Newspapers
criticise the
High Court
Judges

Trump
tweets that
Nigel Farage
of the UK
Independence
Party would
‘do a great
job’

Hammond
delivers his
budget and
estimates that
as a result
of Brexit the
government
will need to
borrow an
extra 58.7
billion pounds

Former Prime
Minister
Tony Blair
says Brexit
deal can be
stopped if
it does not
‘stack up’

Source: The authors.

Figure 1. Economic Policy Uncertainty Indexes
Source: The authors.

European
Council
President
Donal Tusk
tells UK
lawmakers
that Brexit
is creating
‘anxiety and
uncertainty’
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Figure 2. UK and US EPUs Evolution Around Events Date
Source: The authors.

election. The indices show a relative stability before the events outcome
is released with interesting developments in both countries that seem
to reflect a level of persistence regarding uncertainty that lasted at least
over a week before the indices revert to more stable levels. The EPU
indices are used in this study to delimit the range of the dummy variables to measure for Brexit and Trump’s election uncertainty. Values of
1 are given to the date when the UK referendum results were released
(24 June 2016) and the announcement of Trump’s election as the 45th
US president (8 November 2016). The dummy variables help to delimit
two scenarios, one looking at a week of market uncertainty and another
looking at a prolonged period that considers the aftermath of each one
of the events until June 2017.
Table 2. Year 2016
February 1

March 1

March 11

May 3

May 26

Trump comes
second in
the Iowa
caucuses

Trump wins
7 of the 11
states that
vote on socalled Super
Tuesday

Trump
continues to
draw huge
crowds,
and a rally
in Chicago
had to be
cancelled due
to violent
protests

Trump wins
Indiana and
becomes the
Republican
Party’s
presumptive
nominee

Trump wins
a majority
of delegates
securing his
nomination
and foreclosing
the possibility
of a contested
convention
(Table 2 continued)
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(Table 2 continued)
June 20

July 15

September 1

Trump fires
his original
campaign
manager,
Corey
Lewandowski
and veteran
republican
strategist
Paul Manafort
takes over

Trump
announces
Indiana
Governor
Mike Pence
as his running
mate

Trump flies
to Mexico
to meet with
the country’s
President
Enrique Peña
Nieto. A brief
diplomatic
scuffle follows
regarding
Trump’s views
on Mexico to
pay for the
border wall

September/
October
Trump
clashes with
Clinton
before an
audience
on tens of
millions
in three
presidential
debates

November 8
Trump wins
US presidential
election

Source: The authors.

4.2 US Elections Highlights
The Chinese stock market reaction to Brexit and Trump’s election
is measured by the identification of abnormal mean returns and also by
looking at the potential shift in returns volatility. The research framework
is supported by three different models that are discussed in the following
sections.
4.2.1 Model One
The first part of the study examines the potential existence of abnormal
mean returns by implementing a multivariate regression model (MVRM)
that aligns to the approach proposed by Bin, Blenman, and Chen (2004),
Kim, Nam, and Wynne (2009) and Nazir, Younus, Kaleem, and Anwar
(2014). The main purpose of this model is to identify a system of portfolio return equations for event announcements with systematic risk and
political events being factored into the pricing process. Equation (1) is
the generic equation that would be adjusted according to the event under
study (Trump election or Brexit referendum) and that would be captured
by the inclusion of a dummy variable in the model.
R i, t = a i + b i R m, t + dDummy i, t + f i, t 

(1)
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where
Ri,t = return on a Greater China Region (GCR) market index i on day t.
ai = intercept coefficient for GCR index.
bi = coefficient of sensitivity to the Trump’s election or to Brexit.
Rm,t = S&P500 return or FTSE 100 return, depending on the event
under consideration.
Dummy = dummy variable that equals 1 during the window period
that considers the event under study (Trump or Brexit) and 0
otherwise.
d = price return reaction to the political event on the corresponding
GCR index i.
fi,t = an independent and identically distributed normal error.
The study is supported by the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
methodology on daily returns over the 253 and 156 trading days around
the identified leadership event windows (Brexit referendum result and
US presidential election respectively). Additionally, the estimation is
supported by daily returns over a week after the event under study in order
to consider short-run implications. In this way, the jointly estimate of
the abnormal mean return performance of the three GCR indices is considered over a short-time period that is very close to the political event under
study and also over a longer period of sustained market and EPU. As such,
the research hypotheses under consideration are as follows:
Hypothesis A: d = 0—Meaning that the estimated abnormal return
for each one of the three GCR market indices equals zero when
the corresponding event—leadership event (Trump’s election or
Brexit) occurs.
The model is adjusted to consider the implications of EPU, and as a
result, the initial regression equation presented in Equation (1) is adjusted
as follows:
R i, t = a i + b i R m, t + dDummy i, t + iEPU i, t + f i, t 

(2)

Hypothesis B: i = 0—Meaning that international economic political
uncertainty does not generate an impact on the three GCR market
indices.
The model is estimated to test again for: d = 0, with the aim of verifying
if there is a significant change on the outcomes once the EPU index is
introduced in the model estimation.
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Liu and Zhang (2015) showed that incorporating EPU as an additional
variable in the implementation of volatility prediction models significantly
improves their forecasting ability. Therefore, our decision of including
EPU as part of our research framework is more than justified as we aim
to cross-check our results and to analyse if the introduction of EPU in the
model brings different and significant results confirming the importance
of EPU for stock market performance.
4.2.2 Model Two
Model one was adjusted to introduce four control variables that seek to
find out if there are variations regarding the outcomes of EPU as outlined
in Equation (2). The initial regression model presented in Equation (1)
above is adjusted once more to integrate the selected control variables.
A note of caution is needed here, as there were limitations regarding the
control variables associated with market uncertainty that could not be
considered as part of this study due to their unavailability as daily frequency variables. For example, relevant economic indicators for China
were not considered as there were no data available in DataStream with
a daily frequency. A similar situation was faced when trying to integrate
additional indicators for EPU like Global economic uncertainty or Chinese
economic uncertainty, as available data were found in monthly frequency.
After careful consideration of the variables that could improve the model,
four additional indexes were considered. The selected control variables
were as follows: (a) the volatility index (VIX) that was included as a variable that helped to capture market sentiment over the period of study, as
it is considered as a good estimator of expected market volatility; (b) the
Hong Kong volatility index (HSI Volatility Index) is an indicator of the
volatility exhibited by the Hong Kong Stock market, and it is considered
as the premier barometer for investor sentiment; (c) the Chinese 3-month
repo rate (China—3mRepo rate) is the interbank rate on short-term loans
between banks in local currency and that seeks to measure for market
instability derived from access to liquidity and the fourth control variable was the Chinese Renminbi 3month FX volatility variable to capture
instability in the currency market. Equation (3) considers the additional
model to be estimated.
R i, t = a i + b i R m, t + dDummy i, t + iEPU i, t + cControl i, t + f i, t  (3)
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4.2.3 Model Three
The third phase of the estimation process considers market volatility
employing the ‘Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity’
GARCH framework, with the objective of examining the effects that the
chosen events will have on volatility performance in the corresponding
GCR stock index returns. The Exponential GARCH model introduced by
Nelson (1991) allows to analyse the impact of ‘good and bad news’ on
volatility. The EGARCH (1, 1) is chosen on the grounds that this model
does not have constraints regarding ‘non-negativity’ of its parameters
(Bin, 2015; Lin & Wang, 2005; Suleman, 2012). The EGARCH model
is defined as follows:
log (v 2t ) = ~ + a ft (z t - 1) + b log (v 2t - 1) 

(4)

ft (z t - 1) = (|z t - 1|) - E |z t - 1| + cz t - 1 

(5)

z t - 1 = e t - 1 /v t - 1 

(6)

where

a, b and c are parameters for the conditional variance estimation. The
alpha coefficient explains the influence of past standardised residuals on
current volatility. The beta coefficient measures the impact of past-period
variance on the current period conditional variance. The gamma coefficient
accounts for the asymmetry effect. If gamma is negative, it will signify
that bad news have a greater impact on volatility than good news with
the same magnitude. The EGARCH models the logarithmic time-varying
conditional variance; consequently, these models allowed its parameters
to become negative. As a result, the model is not subject to non-negativity
constraints in the parameters as it is the case for the traditional GARCH
and GJR models. However, in order to meet stationary requirements, the
beta coefficient should be less than one (b < 1). Since the gamma coefficient looks at asymmetric effects, the coefficient would be equal to zero
if positive and negative shocks have an equal impact on the variance.
If the magnitude of a negative (positive) shock causes the variance to
increase (decrease), the gamma coefficient will be lower than zero (c < 0).
In the case that positive (negative) shocks cause the variance to increase
(decrease), the gamma coefficient would be greater than zero (c > 0).
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Table 3. EGARCH Stationarity Restriction
Coefficients Meaning

Implications

a

Represents the magnitude
effect or the symmetric
effect of the model, the
GARCH effect.

b

Measures the persistence
in conditional volatility
irrespective of anything
happening in the market –
b<1
Measures the asymmetry
of the leverage effect.

c

The coefficient measures the
effect of the previous period in
the information set and explains
the past standardised residuals’
influence on the current volatility.
If beta is relatively large, volatility
takes a long time to die out

If c = 0, the model is symmetric.
If c < 0, positive shocks generate
less volatility than negative shocks.
If c > 0, positive shocks are more
destabilising than negative news.

Source: The authors.

The variance equation considered in this study is outlined as follows:
log (v 2t ) = ~ + a j ft (z t - 1) + b j log (v t2- 1) + {Dummy t 

(7)

log (v 2t ) = ~ + a j ft (z t - 1) + b j log (v t2- 1) + {Dummy t + tEPU t  (8)

Table 4. Series Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive
Statistics
Mean
Standard
deviation
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque Bera
Observations

Mainland
China

Taiwan

FTSE 100

S&P 500

0.0436
1.6138

0.0174
0.7891

0.0113
0.9103

0.0307
0.7900

−0.3468
−1.3002
5.979707
9.8401
350.9905 2008.131
900
900

−0.5128
6.7502
566.8596
900

−0.1682
5.6071
259.1380
900

−0.3834
5.8693
330.8018
900

Hong Kong
0.0116
1.0597

Source: The authors.
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5. Empirical Findings
Descriptive statistics show that market returns over the period of study are
positive for all cases with Mainland China exhibiting better performance
followed by the S&P500, while stock markets in Hong Kong and Taiwan
seem to follow the overall performance of the FTSE100. The standard
deviation signposts the Shanghai stock market as the most volatile over
the period of study with the S&P500 exhibiting lower fluctuations. All the
markets are negatively skewed and exhibit kurtosis and non-normality.
The estimation of Equations (1) and (2) shows that the markets do
not exhibit abnormal returns in any case. The models considered market
uncertainty since the date of occurrence of each one of the events (Brexit
and Trump’s election) over a week and also over a longer period (up
to June 2017). Furthermore, the inclusion of the EPU index and of the
control variables did not affect the initial outcomes. The results indicate
that Brexit and Trump’s election did not lead to a significant increase
in market uncertainty in the GCR. The research findings suggest that
Chinese stock markets might be waiting for specific actions to be taken
by the UK and US administration that show if they aim to harm China’s
interests. The results do not seem to align with research in the field that
has suggested that the EPU index helps to identify if market participants
are reacting to political events (Anatonakakis et al., 2013; Brogaard &
Detzel, 2015; Kang & Ratti, 2015; Li & Peng, 2017; Liu & Zhang, 2015).
The outcomes for the GCR seem to align with the study of Dopke and
Pierdzioch (2006) which looks at the German stock market, where political changes showed a poor relationship with stock market performance.
These outcomes indicate that Chinese stock markets might be maturing
and that they start to exhibit patterns commonly associated with more
developed and established stock markets. On the other hand, there is a need
for highlighting the fact that Chinese stock markets are heavily prone to
state intervention and that SOEs have a heavy representation among the
listed companies.
The estimation of the EGARCH model confirms the non-existence
of abnormal returns as the d coefficient is insignificant in every case.
The results show that Hong Kong and Taiwan are more affected by the
occurrence of negative news as the c coefficient is negative and significant
in every case. However, Mainland China differs, and the Shanghai stock
market volatility seems to be more affected by positive news rather than
by negative innovations.

−0.4301
0.1936
−0.4429

Hong Kong
Mainland China
Taiwan

t-Value

d

d

t-Value

0.2840
0.7014
0.1371

0.2802
0.7416
0.6324

p-Value

Equation (2)—with EPU

0.8237
−0.4228
−1.080
0.6028
0.1998
0.3298
0.9748
−0.4451
0.4785
Trump’s election—8 November 2016
−1.0989
0.2721
−0.4177
−1.072
0.3197
0.7492
0.2314
0.3836
−1.5212
0.1286
−0.4316
−1.4880

−0.2229
0.5206
−0.0316

t-Value

0.4913
0.8222
0.5301

0.3742
0.7819
0.5255

p-Value

−1.112
−0.5629
0.5225

−0.7701
−0.088
−0.343

t-Value

0.2661
0.5736
0.6014

0.4414
0.9290
0.7312

p-Value

−0.00052
−0.000143
−0.00017

−0.0006
−0.0005
0.0002

d

−0.7780
−0.1274
−0.3433

−1.1053
−0.5918
0.5325

t-Value

0.4367
0.8986
0.7314

0.2693
0.5541
0.5945

p-Value

Equation (3)—Control Variables

−0.0006
−0.0005
0.0002

−0.0005
−9.90E-05
−0.00017

d

Equation (3) – Control Variables

Source: The authors.
Notes: EPU appears as insignificant in all the regressions, as also the generation of abnormal returns over the periods of continuous uncertainty. In the case of the
model including the control variables, all the variables included in the model appeared to be insignificant. However, the volatility index for Hong Kong showed a
10 per cent significance level, an outcome that was considered weak; this nevertheless offers some insights regarding the influence of the most developed regional
market on Chinese stock markets and the former might act as a conduit for external market uncertainty.

−0.0811
0.3151
−0.0088

d

Equation (2) – With EPU

0.3633
0.0632
0.8890
0.7451
−0.0326
−0.2768
0.5382
0.0345
0.6351
Trump’s election—8 November 2016
0.0906
0.4885
0.0623
0.6885
−0.5339
0.5935
−0.0286
−0.2247
0.0674
0.6129
0.0385
0.6281

0.9095
−0.3251
0.6158

Equation (1)—No EPU

Hong Kong
Mainland China
Taiwan

BREXIT—24 June 2016

d

0.0628
−0.0748
0.0341

Hong Kong
Mainland China
Taiwan

Leadership Event—1
week

0.0645
−0.0384
0.0334

Hong Kong
Mainland China
Taiwan

p-Value

t-Value

BREXIT—24 June 2016

d

Equation (1) – No EPU

Leadership Event –After
Event

Table 5. Abnormal Returns—Equations (1) and (2)
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Table 6. Volatility Model Without Economic Policy Uncertainty
Leadership
Event—
Without
EPU Index
Mean
Equation
ai
bi
d

~
aj
c
bj
{

BREXIT—24 June 2016

Trump’s Election—
8 November 2016

Hong
Kong

Mainland
China

Taiwan

Hong
Kong

−0.0177
(0.6779)
0.2341
(0.000)*
0.0709
(0.274)

0.0921
(0.0614)***
0.1282
(0.003)*
−0.0664
(0.2826)

−0.0147
(0.6352)
0.1558
(0.000)*
0.0395
(0.4176)

–0.0097
(0.7971)
0.2350
(0.000)*
0.0796
(0.2031)

−0.0729
(0.000)*
0.1047
(0.000)*
−0.0378
(0.002)*
0.9610
(0.000)*
−0.0282
(0.002)*

Variance equation
−0.0732
−0.0159 −0.0553
(0.000)*
(0.1465) (0.000)*
0.1066
0.0106
0.0807
(0.000)*
(0.4545) (0.000)*
0.0335
−0.1057 −0.0503
(0.000)*
(0.000)* (0.000)*
0.9972
0.9811
0.9556
(0.000)*
(0.000)* (0.000)*
−0.0100
−0.0110 −0.0519
(0.0861)
(0.1984) (0.002)*

Mainland
China

Taiwan

0.0937
0.0031
(0.0214)** (0.8185)
0.1303
0.1648
(0.0035)* (0.000)*
−0.0890
0.0342
(0.1336)
(0.4358)
−0.0760
(0.000)*
0.1079
(0.000)*
0.0354
(0.000)*
0.9986
(0.000)*
−0.0080
(0.2480)

0.0295
(0.000)*
−0.048
(0.000)*
−0.084
(0.000)*
0.9871
(0.000)*
−0.017
(0.007)*

Source: The authors.
Notes: ~ (constant); aj (Impact of magnitude of a shock(size) and bjGarch effect.
Persistence of past volatility (past volatility explains current volatility); c (impact of sign
of shock); if the coefficient is negative, there is a leverage effect: bad news have more of
an impact than good news on the same size; { (dummy variable). Volatility estimations
were not adjusted to include the control variables as the coefficients were not found to be
statistically significant. *1% significance level, **5% significance level, *** 10% significance
level.

The EGARCH model outcomes do not seem to be affected by the
inclusion of the EPU index in the estimation, and the research outcomes
confirm that Hong Kong and Taiwan seem to react to negative news,
whereas China is more sensitive to the occurrence of positive news. The
markets do not seem to show a significant reaction to Brexit and Trump’s
election as the d coefficient measuring for each event is statistically
insignificant; this is also the case for i that captures the impact of the
EPU index. The core research findings indicate that Brexit and Trump’s
election do not seem to be generating significant levels of volatility in the
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Table 7. Volatility Model Without Economic Policy Uncertainty
Leadership
Event—
With EPU
Index
Mean
Equation
ai
bi
d
i

~
aj
c
bj
{
t

BREXIT—24 June 2016
Hong
Kong

Mainland
China

Taiwan

Trump’s Election—
8 November 2016
Hong
Kong

−0.0130
0.0888
−0.0070 −0.0072
(0.7398) (0.0769)*** (0.8130) (0.8485)
0.4768
0.1782
0.2525
0.2303
(0.000)* (0.000)*
(0.000)* (0.000)*
0.0576 −0.0699
−0.0008
0.0786
(0.3160) (0.252)
(0.9860) (0.2079)
0.0000
0.0002
0.0003 −0.0005
(0.9871) (0.772)
(0.5286) (0.4194)
Variance equation
−0.0853 −0.0823
−0.0017 −0.0534
(0.000)* (0.000)*
(0.8662) (0.000)*
0.1127
0.1198
−0.0107
0.0772
(0.000)* (0.000)*
(0.3992) (0.000)*
−0.0486
0.0270
−0.0950 −0.0444
(0.002)* (0.003)*
(0.000)* (0.000)*
0.9662
0.9958
0.9808
0.9609
(0.000)* (0.000)*
(0.000)* (0.000)*
−0.0236 −0.0119
−0.0067 −0.0469
(0.0157)** (0.0771)*** (0.3257) (0.002)*
0.0046
0.0014
0.0043
0.0014
(0.000)* (0.1316)
(0.000)* (0.134)

Mainland
China

Taiwan

0.0935
(0.0194)**
0.1214
(0.007)*
−0.0836
(0.1558)
−0.0002
(0.7135)

0.0255
(0.0335)**
0.1430
(0.000)*
0.0127
(0.7745)
0.0002
(0.5095)

−0.0725
(0.000)*
0.1032
(0.000)*
0.0361
(0.000)*
0.9982
(0.000)*
−0.0075
(0.242)
0.0025
(0.004)*

0.0356
(0.000)*
−0.0603
(0.000)*
−0.0859
(0.000)*
0.9848
(0.000)*
−0.0190
(0.002)*
0.0026
(0.000)*

Source: The authors.
Notes: ~ (constant); aj (Impact of magnitude of a shock(size) and bj Garch effect.
Persistence of past volatility (past volatility explains current volatility); c (impact of sign
of shock); if the coefficient is negative, there is a leverage effect: bad news has more of an
impact than good news on the same size; { (dummy variable); t (EPU variable). Volatility
estimations were not adjusted to include the control variables as coefficients were not
found to be statistically significant. *1% significance level, **5% significance level, *** 10%
significance level.

GCR. The results are not surprising as over the years China has managed
to remain quite isolated to global shocks with the government exercising
high levels of intervention in its capital markets. While being gradually
reformed, the Chinese financial markets are still rather insulated from
major international shocks. These results seem to confirm the strong position of China in the international context and that might help the country
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to weather economic policies from developed economies that aim to harm
its global position.

6. Critical Insights on China’s Stock Holding
Patterns
During the 1980s, the Chinese stock market started its development process
with the introduction of a legal framework that sought to allow companies to issue shares and to encourage them to start local trading activities
by selling small amount of shares to the public. In December 1990, the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets started to operate (again in the case
of Shanghai after a long period of interruption under Mao’s policies) with
at the time only eight names listed representing a market capitalisation
of USD 500 million. The situation has changed quite dramatically, as
by the year 2017, more than 3,000 companies were listed with a market
capitalisation of over RMB 50 trillion. A specific feature of the Chinese
stock markets is the large representation of the most important Chinese
companies that are state-owned, including large banks and oil companies
that are controlled by the Central Government through the State-Owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the ruling State
Council (SASAC), which appoints CEOs and makes decisions in terms of
large investments (Andreosso-O’Callaghan & Gottwald, 2013; Firth, Gao,
Shen, & Zhang, 2016; Gang & Hope, 2013). Through state ownership,
the Chinese SOEs enjoy massive state support that insulates them from
competition while facilitating the government growth policies. Shanghai
has historically been home to China’s most prominent large capitalised
companies. On the other hand, Shenzhen is host to smaller and midcapitalised companies with a higher level of private ownership. Chinese
SOEs still dominate the enterprises landscape, with SOEs representing
around 70 per cent of the Chinese top-500 enterprises, 94 per cent of assets
and 88 per cent of profits (OECD, 2017). They contribute to 93 per cent
of the taxes generated, and they employ 89 per cent of the total workforce
in the Chinese top-500 enterprises. A further breakdown of the outlined
figures shows that in the manufacturing sector, SOEs account for about
50 per cent of firms, contributing 61 per cent of the total profit. In the
services sector, SOEs account for 61 per cent of the firms, with 93 per cent
of assets and 92 per cent of profits among the top-500 enterprises (Gang,
Yang, & Janus, 2009; OECD, 2017). At the global level and thanks to the
Chinese Government ‘Go Global Strategy’, Chinese SOEs are becoming
more and more significant, and they show high levels of concentration
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in strategic sectors that help and serve specific government purposes.
The significant presence of the Chinese government in these stock
markets implies that price fluctuations in these stock exchanges are heavily
dependent on the government moves and in particular on its short-term
speculative strategies and as such, macroeconomic fundamentals do
not appear to be impacting upon China’s major stock markets behaviour. Neither the Shanghai nor the Shenzhen stock exchange market is
considered as being a ‘developed market’, and the two markets still
need to engage in further modernisation processes that align them with
international practices. Important areas of concern relate to the markets
insufficient levels of transparency and lower financial reporting standards
that pose serious limitations to the potential of developing analytical
reports based on their companies’ financial results (Gang & Hope, 2013;
OECD, 2017). Moreover, there is a serious disconnect between share
valuations and financial results, a disconnect which is partly explained
by the dominance of these SOEs in these stock exchanges, and therefore
by the government’s political goals, often disregarding the interest of
minority shareholders. Another aspect that needs to be considered is market instability associated with the deterioration in the stock exchanges, a
phenomenon exacerbated by corruption among stock market regulators;
insider trading is common practice, and flows of personnel between the
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the firms that
trade in shares are unrestricted, leading to obvious conflicts of interest.
To sum up, the characteristics, dynamics and stock holding patterns of the
Chinese stock markets offer some interesting insights that help support the
main empirical outcomes of this study indicating that the Chinese stock
exchanges are relatively sheltered from EPU derived from Brexit and
from the election of Donald Trump; Chinese stock markets behaviour is
carefully designed and framed by the Chinese government.

6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
In general, the research findings highlight the importance for world leading
economies to maintain political stability, as their economic policies can
generate significant levels of anxiety and uncertainty. There is no doubt
that the GCR needs to monitor unfolding events in two of the world most
developed economies, as China trade interests are quite linked to the
USA and to the EU. However, in the context of the Greater China Region,
the main research findings suggest that Brexit and the US election are
not generating significant variations on market returns performance
and the impact of EPU in the global context appears to be insignificant.
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China’s stocks markets do not seem to be panicking and overreacting to
recent major world events. These results seem to confirm China’s historical behaviour regarding international shocks in so far as the country has
managed to remain unscathed, an outcome that can be explained by the
tight control exercised by the government on its capital markets. Further
research in the area should consider looking at causal effects running
from international EPU; this would offer an in-depth understanding of
the key political events that might have a greater impact on stock market
performance in the Chinese context and of the trade channel and its spillover effects to the country’s main macroeconomic fundamentals and its
capital markets.
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Appendix
Figure A1. Volatility Patterns on Studied Variables

(Appendix continued)
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(Appendix continued)

Source: The authors.

Note
1. Macau is not included as part of this study because it does not have a stock
market. However, companies can seek listing in the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange, as both regions financial regulatory authorities cooperate on issues
of mutual concern.
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